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A security analysis of a recently proposed secure communication scheme based on the phase
synchronization of chaotic systems is presented. It is shown that the system parameters directly
determine the ciphertext waveform, hence it can be readily broken by parameter estimation of the
ciphertext signal.
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Most secure chaotic communication systems are based
on complete synchronization (CS), whereas a new cryp-
tosystem has been proposed based on phase synchroniza-
tion (PS). This scheme hides binary messages in the in-
stantaneous phase of the drive subsystem used as the
transmitting signal to drive the response subsystem. Al-
though it is claimed to be secure against some traditional
attacks in the chaotic cryptosystems literature, includ-
ing the parameter estimation attack, we show that it is
breakable by this attack. As a conclusion, the system is
not secure and should not be used for communications
where security is a strict requirement.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a great number of cryptosystems based
on chaos have been proposed [1, 2], most of them fun-
damentally flawed by a lack of robustness and security
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. In [15], a secure
communication scheme based on the phase synchroniza-
tion of a chaotic system is proposed.
In this new scheme the plaintext binary message b is
hidden in the instantaneous phase of the drive subsystem
used as transmitting signal to drive the response subsys-
tem. At the response subsystem, the phase difference is
detected and its strong fluctuation above or below zero
recovers the plaintext at certain coupling strength.
The secure communication process is illustrated by
means of an example based on coupled Ro¨ssler chaotic
oscillators. In the example, the drive subsystem is formed
by two weak coupled oscillators. The plaintext is used to
modulate the same parameter in both oscillators 1 and
2. The equations of the drive subsystem are:
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FIG. 1: Plaintext recovery with the authorized receiver. Time
histories of: (a) plaintext b; (b) ciphertext φ∗
m
; (c) recon-
structed phase signal of the response subsystem φ∗3; (e) dif-
ference between the ciphertext and the reconstructed signal
φ∗
m
− φ∗3; (f) reconstructed plaintext b
′.
x˙1,2 = −(ω +∆ω)y1,2 − z1,2 + ε(x2,1 − x1,2),
y˙1,2 = (ω +∆ω)x1,2 + αy1,2, (1)
z˙1,2 = β + z1,2(x1,2 − γ).
The response subsystem is governed by:
x˙3 = −ω
′y3 − z3 + η((x
2
3 + y
2
3)
1/2cosφm − x3),
y˙3 = ω
′x3 + α
′y3, (2)
z˙3 = β + z3(x3 − γ).
In the example, the parameter values are: ω = ω ′ = 1,
ε = 5× 10−3, η = 5.3, and α = α ′ = 0.15 .
2FIG. 2: Ciphertext phase signal φ∗
m
as function of α: (a)
α = 0.01, the phase increases almost linearly; (b) α = 0.15,
the phase increases monotonically with chaotic behavior; (c)
α = 0.25, the phase increases and decreases irregularly.
The parameters β and γ are held as constants, with
the values {β, γ} = {0.2, 10}.
The parameter ω corresponds to the natural frequency
of the Ro¨ssler oscillator drive subsystems 1 and 2. The
parameter ω ′ corresponds to the natural frequency of
the Ro¨ssler oscillator driven subsystem 3, ε corresponds
to the weak coupling factor between the oscillators 1 and
2, and η corresponds to the strong coupling factor in the
driven oscillator 3.
The parameter mismatch ∆ω is modulated by the
plaintext, being ∆ω = 0.01 if the bit to be transmit-
ted is “1” and ∆ω = −0.01 if the bit to be transmitted
is “0”.
The ciphertext consists of the phase of the mean field
of the drive oscillators:
φm = arctan
x1 + x2
y1 + y2
.
As the phase is a signal that has an unbounded ampli-
tude it can not be transmitted through physical channels.
This problem is overcome by coding the signal from pi to
−pi, which corresponds to the Poincare´ surface of the
atractor, y1,2 = 0. As a consequence, the transmitted
ciphertext, marked as φ∗m, is a sawtooth-like signal with
a period equal to the revolution period of the oscillator.
At the receiving end the phase of the response subsys-
tem is:
φ3 = arctan
x3
y3
that is also coded from pi to −pi as φ∗3.
The plaintext is retrieved by calculating the differ-
ence between the ciphertext and the reconstructed sig-
nal, φ∗m − φ
∗
3. The difference signal consisted of positive
and negative peaks that correspond to the ones and zeros
of the plaintext.
The example of [15] is illustrated in Fig. 1. We have
simulated it with a four order Runge-Kutta integration
algorithm in MATLAB 6, with a step size of 0.001. In
order to recover the plaintext with the exact waveform,
allowing for a small time delay, we have included a Smith-
trigger as a reconstruction filter, with switch on point at
4 and switch off point at -4.
FIG. 3: Power spectral analysis of the ciphertext signal. The
highest peak corresponds to the frequency of ω and lies at
ω ≈ 1.1 .
As in the example of [15] there is no indica-
tion about the parameter initial values, our sim-
ulation is implemented with the following initial
values: (x
(0)
1 , x
(0)
2 , x
(0)
3 , y
(0)
1 , y
(0)
2 , y
(0)
3 , z
(0)
1 , z
(0)
2 , z
(0)
3 ) =
(−5,−3,−1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
The authors seemed to base the security of its secure
communication system on the properties of the phase
synchronization. They claimed that it can not be broken
by some traditional attacks used against secure chaotic
systems with complete synchronization, but no general
analysis of security was included.
Although the authors point out that the system pa-
rameters play the role of secret key in transmission [15,
§V], it is not clearly specified which parameters are con-
sidered as candidates to form part of the key, what the
allowable value range of those parameters is, what the
key space is (how many different keys exist in the sys-
tem) and how they would be managed.
The weaknesses of this system and the method to break
it are discussed in the next section.
II. BREAKING THE SYSTEM
The main problem with this cryptosystem lies on the
fact that the ciphertext is an analog signal, whose wave-
form depends on the system parameter values. Likewise,
the difference between the ciphertext and the phase sig-
nal of a non synchronized receiver φ∗m − φ
∗
3, depends on
these same parameters. The study of these signals pro-
vides the necessary information to recover a good esti-
mation of the system parameter values and the correct
plaintext, as will be seen next.
Let us assume that the key consists of the oscillator’s
parameters α and ω, as they are the only unknowns in the
example of [15]. Moreover the parameters β and γ, that
were constants in the example, can not be part of the key
because, according to our experiments, the synchroniza-
tion of the Ro¨ssler oscillator is indifferent to a mismatch
of the value of these parameters in a range greater than
1 to 1000.
The search space of α may be restricted to the unique
suitable value range for operation, characterized by the
mild chaotic region of the Ro¨ssler oscillator, in which
its phase increases monotonically with time, showing a
chaotic increase rate, that allows hiding the binary in-
3FIG. 4: Determination of the best value of ω′: (a) ciphertext
signal with frequency ω = 1.00; (b) phase signal of the free
running intruder receiver φ∗3 for ω
′ = 1.03; (c) output of the
phase comparator φ∗
m
− φ∗3 for ω
′ = 1.03; (d) phase signal of
the free running intruder receiver φ∗3 for ω
′ = 1.015; (e) output
of the phase comparator φ∗
m
− φ∗3 for ω
′ = 1.015; (f) phase
signal of the free running intruder receiver φ∗3 for ω
′ = 1.005;
(g) output of the phase comparator φ∗
m
− φ∗3 for ω
′ = 1.005.
formation. This region is roughly characterized by the
following values of α:
0.03 ≤ α ≤ 0.18 . (3)
The operation of the system with lower values of α
should be avoided because the waveform of the oscillator
is quite uniform and its phase increases almost linearly
with time. Therefore, the instantaneous phase fluctua-
tions, due to the binary information modulation, can not
be effectively hidden, and thus the information could be
easily retrieved from the signal.
Higher values of α should be also avoided because the
Ro¨ssler oscillator operates in the wild chaotic region, in
which the phase does not increases monotonically with
time, showing erratic increases and decreases, rendering
impossible the synchronization of the authorized receiver,
thus preventing the correct data retrieving.
The behavior of the attractor with respect to α is illus-
trated in Fig. 2, in which the time history of the cipher-
text signal φ∗m for three values of α is shown. The first
sample corresponds to α = 0.01, showing that the phase
FIG. 5: Determination of the best value of α ′, with ω ′ =
1.005: (a) original plaintext, b; (b) output of the phase com-
parator φ∗
m
−φ∗3 for α
′ = {0.05, 0.09, 0.13}, which is the same
in three cases; (c) output of the phase comparator φ∗
m
− φ∗3
for α ′ = 0.17; (d) recovered plaintext b′ for α ′ = 0.17.
increases almost linearly. The second one corresponds
to α = 0.15, showing that the phase increases monotoni-
cally with chaotic behavior. The last sample corresponds
to α = 0.25, showing that the phase increases and de-
creases irregularly.
The sensitivity to the parameter values is so low that
the original plaintext can be recovered from the cipher-
text using an intruder receiver system with parameter
values considerably different from the ones used by the
transmitter ([15, Fig. 7]).
We have found that the plaintext b ′ can be recov-
ered even when α ′ has an absolute error of ± 0.2. As
a consequence, it is sufficient to try four values of α ′,
to cover its full usable range. The best set of values is:
α ′ = {0.05, 0.09, 0.13, 0.17}.
In Fig. 3 we show the power spectral analysis of the
ciphertext signal. As can be observed, the frequency of
the Ro¨ssler oscillator is totally evident. The spectrum’s
highest peak appears at ω ′ ≃ 1.03, close to the parameter
value of the drive subsystem ω = 1. Thus, by simply
examining the ciphertext, the second key element ω ′ is
guessed with reasonable accuracy.
Let ω ′ be the approximate value of ω. Once it is mea-
sured we can use it to recover the plaintext in the follow-
ing way.
First, we introduce the estimated value of ω ′ into an
intruder receiver with η = 0, that is without coupling, so
the intruder receiver oscillator will be running freely. To
check whether the estimation of ω ′ is good, we look at
the output of the phase comparator φ∗m−φ
∗
3 as well as at
the ciphertext signal φ∗m and at the phase signal of the
receiver φ∗3.
When the frequencies of transmitter and intruder re-
ceiver are slightly different, then φ∗m − φ
∗
3 will look like
a train of pulses of increasing width summed with a di-
4FIG. 6: Range of ω ′ and α ′ values that that achieve correct
plaintext recovery of a ciphertext generated with {ω, α} =
{1.00, 0.15}.
rect current of increasing level; being the final width and
direct current increasing level rate proportional to the
difference of frequencies ω ′ − ω. Also, the mismatch of
the periods of the phase signals φ∗m and φ
∗
3 is perceptible.
With this information we can adjust the value of ω ′ in
a few steps, until the width of the pulses tends to zero.
Then, the period mismatch of the phase signals φ∗m and
φ∗3 is unnoticeable and its direct current level equals zero.
The procedure is illustrated in Fig. 4. We begin with
ω ′ = 1.03, the value estimated from the spectrum, and
we see that the correct value of ω ′ must be slightly lower,
thus we try ω ′ = 1.015 and we see that we are near
the exact value but still a little bit high. Next we try
ω ′ = 1.005, and we see that the frequency match is quite
good. We retain this last value of ω ′ as the definite one
and go to the next step.
Finally, we set η = 5.3 at the intruder receiver and
look at the retrieved data b ′ for the previously obtained
ω ′ an for each of the four possible values of α ′. In Fig. 5
the retrieved binary data b ′ obtained with ω ′ = 1.005
and α ′ = {0.05, 0.09, 0.13, 0.17} are presented. It can be
seen that for α ′ = {0.05, 0.09, 0.13} only cero value data
are obtained and for α ′ = 0.17 some output data are
present, thus we may assume that the value of α ′ = 0.17
can be retained as the appropriate one to retrieve the
plaintext b ′ and that the data obtained with it consist of
the correct recovered plaintext, as can be verified from
the figure.
Although the estimated pair of values {ω ′, α ′} =
{1.005, 0.17} are far from the right ones, the plaintext
is correctly recovered as a consequence of the system’s
low sensitivity to parameters.
Moreover, we have observed that many other combi-
nations of parameter values allow for the recovery of the
correct plaintext as well. In Fig. 6 we show after many
simulations the region of {ω ′, α ′} values in which correct
plaintext recovery of a ciphertext generated with a drive
subsystem with {ω, α} = {1.00, 0.15} is achieved.
III. CONCLUSION
The proposed cryptosystem is rather weak, since it can
be broken by measuring the power spectrum of the ci-
phertext signal and trying a small set of parameter val-
ues. There is no detailed description about what the key
is, nor what the key space is, a fundamental aspect in ev-
ery secure communication system. The lack of security
discourages the use of this algorithm for secure applica-
tions.
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